economypromЭкономика промышленности / Russian Journal of Industrial EconomicsRussian Journal of Industrial Economics2072-16332413-662XMISIS10.17073/2072-1633-2010-4-8-13economyprom-300Research ArticleСтратегия развитияDevelopment strategyПРОБЛЕМЫ КОЛЛЕКТИВНОГО УПРАВЛЕНИЯ РЕСУРСОМ СОВМЕСТНОГО ПОЛЬЗОВАНИЯ (ПО РАБОТАМ НОБЕЛЕВСКОГО ЛАУРЕАТА 2009 ГОДА Э. ОСТРОМ)THE PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF A RESOURCE OF JOINT USING (ON WORKS OF THE NOBEL WINNER 2009Г E.OSTROM)ЕршоваТ. В.ErshovT. V.

к.э.н., доцент, директор

КрейчманФ. С.KrejchmanF. S.

д.э.н., профессор, генеральный директор

Центр демократических инициатив и экономических технологийRussian FederationНП ЗАО «Электромаш»Russian Federation20100507201504813Copyright © Ершова Т.В., Крейчман Ф.С., 20152015Ершова Т.В., Крейчман Ф.С.Ershov T.V., Krejchman F.S.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://ecoprom.misis.ru/jour/article/view/300

В статье описываются основные положения теории лауреата Нобелевской премии в области экономики 2009 Э. Остром. Особое внимание уделяется способности местных сообществ к самоорганизации при использовании природных ресурсов. Э. Остром опровергает традиционные представления о том, что оптимальное использование ресурсов может быть достигнуто только под контролем государства или путем их приватизации. Э. Остром выделяет основные принципы самоорганизации сообществ, позволяющие достичь оптимизации использования ресурсов. В заключительной части статьи авторы экстраполирует выводы Э. Остром, сделанные применительно к природным системам, на системы рукотворные – современные производственные предприятия с собственностью работников.

The paper focuses on the basic provisions of the theory presented by the 2009 Nobel award winner E. Ostrom. Special attention is given to the ability of local communities of self-organizing when natural resources are consumed. Ostrom disproves the mainstream arguments that the optimal use of the resources can only be achieved under the government control or in the case of their privatization. Ostrom derives the main principles of self-organization of the local communities enabling them to optimize the consumption of the resources. In the last part of the paper the authors extrapolate the Ostrom findings, which were made in application to the natural systems, to the man-made systems – modern industrial enterprises owned by their personnel.

Э. Остромместные сообществасамоорганизацияоптимизация использования ресурсовсобственность работниковOstrom’s findingslocal communitiesself-organizingoptimizationconsumption of resourcespersonnel’s ownershipReferencesOstrom, Elinor. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems.Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems.Ostrom, E., Schroeder, L. & Wynne, S. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1992, Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.Ostrom, E., Schroeder, L. & Wynne, S. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1992, Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.Ostrom, E., Walker, J. & Gardner, R. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994.Ostrom, E., Walker, J. & Gardner, R. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994.Ostrom, Elinor. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton University Press. 2005.Ostrom, Elinor. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton University Press. 2005.Ostrom, Elinor, and T. K. Ahn, eds. Foundations of Social Capital. Edward Elgar, 2003.Ostrom, Elinor, and T. K. Ahn, eds. Foundations of Social Capital. Edward Elgar, 2003.Ostrom, Elinor, and James Walker, eds. Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research. Russell Sage Foundation, 2003.Ostrom, Elinor, and James Walker, eds. Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research. Russell Sage Foundation, 2003.Ostrom Elinor. A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems-Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408, USA.Ostrom Elinor. A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems-Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408, USA.Elinor Ostrom, Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolsak, Paul C. Stern, Susan Stonich, and Elke Weber, eds. The Drama of the Commons. National Academies Press, 2002.Elinor Ostrom, Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolsak, Paul C. Stern, Susan Stonich, and Elke Weber, eds. The Drama of the Commons. National Academies Press, 2002.Ostrom, Elinor. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton University Press. 2005.Ostrom, Elinor. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton University Press. 2005.

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.