economypromЭкономика промышленности / Russian Journal of Industrial EconomicsRussian Journal of Industrial Economics2072-16332413-662XMISIS10.17073/2072-1633-2015-2-24-29economyprom-459Research ArticleСтратегия развитияDevelopment strategyАнализ институциональных предпочтений при кооперативных взаимодействиях для развития промышленных предприятийAnalysis of institutional preferences in the cooperative interactions for the development of industrial enterprisesКукаевИ. С.KukaevI. S.

аспирант кафедры управления социально-экономическими системами,

426034, г. Ижевск, Университетская, 1

426034 Russia, Izhevsk, Universitetskaya, 1

Ikukaev4phd@gmail.comУдмуртский государственный университетРоссияUdmurt State UniversityRussian Federation201510112015022429Copyright © Кукаев И.С., 20152015Кукаев И.С.Kukaev I.S.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://ecoprom.misis.ru/jour/article/view/459

В условиях ориентации РФ на создание полноценной рыночной экономики поиск путей развития промышленных предприятий представляется важным и значимым. Одним из таких путей является развитие кооперативных взаимодействий в форме бизнес-ассоциаций. Предпочтения при принятии решения о подобных коллективных действиях представляют научный интерес и рассматриваются в данной статье на примере Торгово-промышленной палаты (ТПП) и Российского союза промышленников и предпринимателей (РСПП).

В статье приводятся положительные и отрицательные результаты влияния бизнес-ассоциаций на условия развития промышленности. Описание исторического развития институциональных кооперативных взаимодействий в постсоветский период дополняется определением степени влияния плановой экономики и советского режима на характеристики функционирования мультисекторальных бизнес-ассоциаций. Подчеркнута роль кооперативных взаимодействий в форме бизнес-ассоциаций для заполнения сложившегося институционального вакуума при смене политического режима.

Показаны причины формирования кооперативных взаимодействий в виде бизнес-ассоциаций. Представлены направления деятельности, цели и возможности промышленных предприятий, для которых бизнес-ассоциации могут выступать в качестве механизма их достижения. Обозначены предпосылки формирования предпочтений хозяйствующих субъектов в пользу того или иного института кооперации. Проведен анализ положительных и отрицательных результатов влияния бизнес-ассоциаций на условия развития промышленности, что способствует развитию теории стратегического управления отечественными промышленными организациями.

В статье показаны различия в членской базе хозяйствующих субъектов между Торгово-промышленной палатой и Российским союзом промышленников и предпринимателей. Региональные отделения Российского союза промышленников и предпринимателей уступают региональным отделениям Торгово-промышленной палаты, когда речь заходит о принятии хозяйствующими субъектами решения о вступлении в мультисекторальную бизнес-ассоциацию. Даны рекомендации для менеджеров промышленных предприятий.

Since the Russian Federation has chosen a strategy towards orientation on import substitution, the topic of searching for alternative ways of industrial enterprise development becomes the primary interest. One of the approaches is cooperative interactions in the form of business associations. Preferences in regard to making a decision towards these collective actions present a scientific interest and are studied in this article on the example of Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) and Russian union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE). This article summarizes positive and negative impacts of business associations on industry development. A description of historical evolution of institutional cooperative interactions in the post-soviet period is supplemented with analysis of the degree of planning economy and soviet regime influence on characteristics of multisectoral business associations. The role of cooperative interactions in the form of business associations for filling the institutional void after the change of political regime is highlighted.

The reasons for formation of cooperative interactions in the form of business associations are presented. Business directions, goals, and opportunities for enterprises are delineated , for which business associations can present a driving force to achieve the targets. Preconditions for preference formation among economic agents towards particular institutions are defined. An analysis of positive and negative outcomes of business associations impact on industry development is conducted contributing to the theory of Russian industrial enterprises strategical management.

The article analyses differences between various economic agents on the example of Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) and the Russian union of industrialists and entrepreneurs (RUIE). Regional CCI offices are preferred to RUIE ones when it comes to decide on participation in a multisectoral business association.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.