Analysis of institutional preferences in the cooperative interactions for the development of industrial enterprises
https://doi.org/10.17073/2072-1633-2015-2-24-29
Abstract
Since the Russian Federation has chosen a strategy towards orientation on import substitution, the topic of searching for alternative ways of industrial enterprise development becomes the primary interest. One of the approaches is cooperative interactions in the form of business associations. Preferences in regard to making a decision towards these collective actions present a scientific interest and are studied in this article on the example of Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) and Russian union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE). This article summarizes positive and negative impacts of business associations on industry development. A description of historical evolution of institutional cooperative interactions in the post-soviet period is supplemented with analysis of the degree of planning economy and soviet regime influence on characteristics of multisectoral business associations. The role of cooperative interactions in the form of business associations for filling the institutional void after the change of political regime is highlighted.
The reasons for formation of cooperative interactions in the form of business associations are presented. Business directions, goals, and opportunities for enterprises are delineated , for which business associations can present a driving force to achieve the targets. Preconditions for preference formation among economic agents towards particular institutions are defined. An analysis of positive and negative outcomes of business associations impact on industry development is conducted contributing to the theory of Russian industrial enterprises strategical management.
The article analyses differences between various economic agents on the example of Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) and the Russian union of industrialists and entrepreneurs (RUIE). Regional CCI offices are preferred to RUIE ones when it comes to decide on participation in a multisectoral business association.
About the Author
I. S. Kukaev
Udmurt State University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
426034 Russia, Izhevsk, Universitetskaya, 1
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For citations:
Kukaev I.S. Analysis of institutional preferences in the cooperative interactions for the development of industrial enterprises. Russian Journal of Industrial Economics. 2015;(2):24-29. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.17073/2072-1633-2015-2-24-29
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