Rethinking industrial policy in the context of the social contract through the lens of economic theory

The purpose of the article is to reconsider the industrial policy in the context of the social contract in terms of such issues as the relationship between private initiative and public policy in the industrial sector, manufacturing and rent as the sources of public welfare, freedom of trade and protectionist measures, transfer of knowledge and protection of technological sovereignty, the global division of labor and ensuring import independence, as well as negotiations on the priorities of human capital development. The hypothesis of this article is the assumption that the industrial policy is formed and corrected as a result of coordination of the interests of society, business and government on the issues of that policy in the context of the social contract that are of great importance for them. The authors have consistently substantiated this hypothesis through a single structure of consideration of each of the indicated issues: definition of the genesis, concept and place in the economic theory of categories that are a subject of choice in the context of industrial policy, identifying the role of society/business in terms of such choice, coordination of interests of economic agents in formation and correction of the industrial policy. As a result of the study. the authors come to the conclusion that in the 21^st century social contract, which is only partially put on paper within the framework of the constitution of the state, is underestimated as a tool of state regulation and self-regulation of the economics. The implicit part of such a contract, which responds most flexibly to the changes in economic, political and social conditions, is the most significant factor of successful implementation of the government economic (including industrial) policy. Due to this, such a policy should become the subject of the negotiations between the society, business and authorities to develop mutually beneficial terms of cooperation.

1. Белл Д. Грядущее постиндустриальное общество. Опыт социального прогнозирования. Пер. с англ. М.: Academia; 2004. 788 с. (Пер. с англ.: Bell D. The Coming of post-industrial society. Experience of social forecasting. New York: Basic Books; 1973. 507 p.)

2. Хабермас Ю. Вовлечение другого: очерки политической теории. Пер. с англ. СПб.: Наука; 2001. 417 с. (Пер. с англ.: Habermas J. The inclusion of the other: studies in political theory. Great Britain: Polity Press: Blackwell Publishers Ltd; 1999. 417 p.)

3. Brooke Ch. (ed.) Hobbes T. Leviathan. Penguin Classics; 2017. 688 p.

4. Locke J. Two treatises of government. Cambridge texts in the history of political thought. Cambridge, England; New York: Cambridge University Press; 1988. 478 p.

5. Руссо Ж.-Ж. Об общественном договоре: трактаты. М.: Канон-Пресс-Ц: Кучково поле; 1998. 416 с. (Пер. с англ.: Rousseau J.-J. The social contract; or principles of political right. New York: Eckler; 1893. 416 p.)

6. Rawls J. A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; 1971. 624 p.

7. Gauthier D. Morals by agreement. New York: Oxford University Press; 1986. 357 p.

8. Binmore K. Game theory and the social contract. Vol. 1. Playing fair. Cambridge University Press: MIT Press; 1994. 388 р.

9. Buchanan J., Tullock G. The calculus of consent: logical foundations of constitutional democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; 1962. 361 p.

10. Scanlon T. What we owe to each other. London: Belk- nap Press of Harvard University Press; 1999. 432 р.

11. Shafik M. What we owe each other: A new social contract for a better society. Princeton University Press; 2021. 256 р.

12. Sen A. The idea of justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; 2009. 497 p.

13. Solow R.M. A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1956;70(1):65–94.

14. Mankiw N.G., Romer D., Weil D.N. A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1992;107(2):407–437.

15. Lucas R.E. Lectures on Economic Growth. Boston: Harvard University Press, 2004. 224 p.

16. Auty R. Sustaining development in mineral economies: The resource curse thesis. London; New York: Routledge; 1993. 272 p.

17. Barro R.J. Democracy and growth. Journal of Economic Growth. 1996;1:1–27. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00163340

18. Ross M. Does oil hinder democracy? World Politics. 2001;53(3):325–361. https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2001.0011

19. Polterovich V., Popov V., Tonis A. Mechanisms of resource curse and economic policy. Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2007;(6):4–27. (In Russ.). https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2007-6-4-27

20. Becker G.S. Human capital. A theoretical and empirical analysis, with special reference to education. University of Chicago Press; 1994. 412 p.

21. Acemoglu D., Robinson J.A. Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty. Crown Business; 2013. 546 p.

22. Sasaev N.I., Kvint V.L. Strategizing the industrial core of the national economy. Russian Journal of Industrial Economics. 2024;17(3):245–260. (In Russ.). https://doi.org/10.17073/2072-1633-2024-3-1349

23. Juhasz R., Lane N., Rodrik D. The new economics of industrial policy. The Annual Review of Economics. 2024;16;213–242. https://doi.org/10.1146/annureveconomics-081023-024638

24. Romer P.M. The origins of endogenous growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 1994;8(1):3–22. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.8.1.3

25. Ostrom E. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. (Political economy of institutions and decisions). Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press; 1991. 298 p.

26. Лист Ф. Национальная система политической экономии. М.: Европа; 2005. 382 с.

27. Kvint V.L., Novikova I.V., Alimuradov M.K. Alignment of global and national interest with regional strategic priorities. Economics and Management. 2021;27(11):900–909. (In Russ.). https://doi.org/10.35854/1998-1627-2021-11-900-909